* Professor Green has been a student of Tanzanian political economy since 1964. Over 1966-74 and during much of 1980 he was Economic Adviser or Consultant to the Tanzania Treasury. However, the opinions in this article are his personal responsibility and are not necessarily those of the Tanzania Treasury. Equally they reflect his present perceptions, not necessarily what he could see earlier.
National Efforts and the International Setting
To study the political economic structure, strategy or trajectory of any polity (especially a small, poor one) out of the context of the global political economic setting is to abstract from reality in a way which is likely to limit or vitiate the analysis. However, it is equally distorting to apply a global model without attention to the actual historic, social and political economic context and direction of a particular political economy.
In practice any single work must choose to emphasise either the global or. the national -here the focus is on Tanzania in the context of the New International Economic The volume of literature on Tanzania suggests that the first assumption is widely accepted. A polity seeking to achieve structural change to meet basic human needs out of a context of extreme poverty and relatively low initial levels of social or political consciousness through participation, self-reliance and transition to socialism is of interest. That is independent of whether one agrees with or dissents from the goals and/or the means and whether one assesses the results as successful, 4 problematic, flawed or disastrous.
The question of degrees of freedom is more vexed. There is a case for arguing that the global political economy determines everything significant on the periphery^ or that economic laws preclude any significant transformation of 6 economies ' like Tanzania in this century.
Both views have had proponents in Tanzania but both are minority views there? if only because for Tanzanians to accept them, is in fact to embrace fatalism and accept defeat in advance.
A more standard Tanzanian perception is that of the 7 President:
I do not emphasise these (global context) things because they make our efforts useless.
On the contrary...only if we... recognise our real situation in the world and what is happening in the world will we be able to understand the size of the task beiore us and use the strength we have to the best advantage.
The Road from Arusha: 1967 Arusha: -1977 Tanzania's 'moderate1 image during the transition to independence and the first years-thereafter was always achieving rates of growth of specific goods and services production and of overall productive .
forces (seen as 6% a year) to achieve the basic aims by -say -the period 1990-2000.^°c reating appropriate and efficient party, government and public enterprise institutions to determine policy, plan and implement the development toward socialism and self reliance.
Tanzania has never claimed to have achieved these goalsalbeit some rather unwary external enthusiasts have claimed that on her behalf. However, significant progress can be perceived in respect to most and perhaps (i) the average overall growth of productive forces has been between 4% and 5% a year and of food between 3^ and 4% a year -above average for Africa or for very poor economies but below the rate required for the strategy; (j) the institutions are more appropriate, adequate and numerous than in 1967. Most suffer from both staff shortages and newness and the range of variation in appropriateness and efficiency is u -u I5 very high.
The pace of change was in many respects faster than anticipated,but the total change needed to achieve either self reliance or socialism had clearly been underestimated.16 The basis for an exploitative system and the worst aspects of exploitation had been removed, but no serious claim that participatory socialist transformation had yet been achieved was -or could bemade. Similarly output and skills had risen but the economy remained fragile as well as poor and the pressures of growth and structural change clearly overstrained the public service and institutional structure.
Ill
Crisis and Response 1974 Response -1977 Response Î n 1973 Response and 1974 As a result of the actions of TANU, ASP and CCM and the actions of our government, our people no longer accept poverty and deprivation as the will of God. Such dissatisfaction with poverty and deprivation is the first step overcoming poverty and backwardness if the way forward is open and the people understand how to proceed. The next step is a matter of leadership and organisation. Broadly Tanzania's economy has advanced. The increased sense of deprivation flows as much from increased levels of consciousness as from, worsened objective conditionsespecially in respect of public services and participation.
Organisation has, in a majority of cases, been relevant and relatively effective; but the balance of effort has not always been optimal and glaring cases of irrelevance, ineffectiveness or a line of action pursued after its own success had made it counterproductive can be identified. It is true that our inefficiency has made things worse...but all (non oil exporting peripheral economies) are suffering from such serious deficits in their foreign exchange balance that they can not any longer import goods essential to their economic well being.
The point is that while Tanzania The most antagonistic contradiction today is the transformation problem. Tanzania cannot feel secure until exports cover at least 75% of imports with imports at levels consistent with full operation of the economy. That is a long way from 53% at austerity import levels and requires a trend reversal.
Autarchy is impractical in a small economy, capital goods production on a substantial scale is implausible before the 1990s and unless oil is discovered transport is necessarily powered by imports. In July President Nyerere stated 34 that Tanzania: will have to take steps to increase the sale of our goods abroad...If it is necessary to sell Khanga or Vitenge or soap or other things we would like to use ourselves, we will have to sell them. It is strange but true that one way to end the shortage of goods which now upsets our people is to sell some of these goods abroad...to plant the seed you have rather than eating it. To tighten your belt today is to eat tomorrow. Those who eat the seed-corn are foolish and shortsighted, in the end they become beggars. When we decide to export some of our goods now it is because we are seeking a means of becoming more self-reliant. We are planting our seed instead of eating it.
The elements of a strategic reformulation exist: Participation is critical for ideological reasons. However, the current imperative for new advances is production oriented:
the development of Tanzania will come from the decisions of Village and Urban governments and from thousands of local groups which decide to help themselves in development and take the actions necessary to do so. 38
These groups are responsible for small scale public However, both views are inconsistent with the main marxian tradition exemplified by Lenin's contention that in any context there were useful struggles with potential for intermediate victories.
7.
'A time of struggle', op cit.
8.
In the first place TANU was always at least vaguely committed to socialism. In the second there never was any substantial effort to create or assist a local bourgeoisie. Perhaps equally critical, until the mid-1960s neither the personnel, institutional nor consciousness base for a radical break with the past existed. The first perspective plan toward 2,000 is being prepared now. However, a number of earlier sectoral plans had 1990 target dates. Shorter period targets -eg villageisation, literacy, universal primary education -were seen, even at the time, as interim, partial steps not long term points of arrival. The problem is paradoxical. Both growth and structural change increase the need for external resources, knowledge and personnel in the short term while reducing them in the long. The Tanzania of 1961 Tanzania of (or 1966 could by now be fully staffed and financed domestically -• but to have continued that neo-colonial pattern would also have meant no commitment to^nor attainment offself reliance. eg in 1977 the main public sector manufacturing group's consolidated pre tax surplus on net assets was virtually 30% but the main food procurementstorage -sale company lost perhaps £20 million. In the special case of Zanzibar virtually all MPs were rejected while Vice President Jumbe was overwhelmingly elected Zanzibar President with a mandate to reform its unrepresentative, conservative Revolutionary Council. This was the first contested election in Zanzibar since Independence and suggested both great disenchantment with many old guard office bearers and relative enthusiasm for increasing Ndugu Jumbe1s power to make changes.
A preliminary crosscheck of public sector investment from alternative sources suggests a rapidly growing under-recording in the National Accourts from 1975 onward.
Tanzania has a record of renegotiating and buying out joint ventures. In manufacturing this has tended to coincide with confidence in managerial and technical capacity.
The two 1980 speeches by the President cited revert to that priority again and again -a theme rarely present in previous years.
Returned -not emerged -President Nyerere has, over the years, regularly stressed the need for efficiency and organisation if scarce resources were to be used to achieve national goals. Indeed 19 77-79 was the exception, not the rule,' after late 1978 clearly because of the Amin war.
In fall 1980 discussion at IDS.
Op cit
International solidarity is not cited simply because Tanzania's diligence in acquiring assistance on its own terms cannot be pressed much further, nor would any practicable change both increase resource availability and be consistent with transition to self reliance and socialism. There, is a better than one in three chance of an oil reservoir able to meet domestic needs to 2,000. There is much less chance of a find totally reversing the structural export/import balance. Therefore, petroleum would make the other elements of the new approach to the transformation problem easier by reducing the needed scale and time pressure rather than rendering them irrelevant. There is no correlation in Tanzania between effective worker participation and bad results nor between authoritarian management and good results. On the whole the evidence points fairly firmly in the reverse direction. Certainly this is so in the case of textiles where more detailed evidence is available on a comparable basis.
'A Time of Struggle', op cit.
The real incomes after tax at $2,500 to $5,250 are low absolutely and the typical salary earner's purchasing power has declined 40 to 60% since 1973. With the post tax inequality down to 7:1 further reduction of the wage/salary ratio seems desirable only if it can be done without further cutting salary earner's real incomes. Morale to date has survived surprisingly well but increases in apathy, moonlighting and corruption are evident and cannot be checked until the material position deterioration is checked.
ibid.
